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This paper elucidates the common law doctrine of stare decisis and the 
methodology of using precedents, including the practice of distinguishing and 
overruling them.1 
As noted in Cross and Harris’s classic book Precedent in English Law, “It is a 
basic principle of the administration of justice that like cases should be decided 
alike.”2 In the common law system, this principle takes on the form of a positive 
obligation: previous decisions must be followed unless there is a justification for 
departing from them. This is the essence of the doctrine of stare decisis. 
After sketching the development of the doctrine of stare decisis and 
explaining what is meant by ratio decidendi, distinguishing, and overruling, this 
paper will reveal a profound insight into precedents, namely, that they are 
employed basically like statutes, but statutes which have a transparent 
“legislative” history or travaux préparatoires. Then the paper will show that 
precedents play a significant role in civil law jurisdictions like Germany. Finally, 
the paper will enumerate the jurisprudential justifications which underpin the 
doctrine of precedent. 
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1.     The historical development of the modern doctrine of 
stare decisis 
 
How did stare decisis come to take on such an important role in the common 
law system? Originally, during the initial development of the common law in 
England when there were very few statutes, the idea took hold that earlier 
decisions could provide assistance in deciding new cases. This phenomenon is 
seen most clearly in Henry de Bracton’s De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae 
(The Laws and Customs of England), published in the mid-13th century. Bracton 
systematized all of English law into a rational system in this seminal work. And 
the law that he systematized consisted of judicial pronouncements alongside 
statute law. Bracton makes no distinction between them relative to sources of 
law and stature: judicial pronouncements are simply accorded equal status with 
statutes. This view of the law was not just Bracton’s: it reflected the 
understanding of law in the early centuries of the common law that judicial 
pronouncements were merely statements of what the judges believed the law 
to be at the time. They were not understood to constitute acts of a sovereign 
who wished to change existing law. The common law was already in existence, 
waiting to be discovered by the king’s judges. 
Even though judicial pronouncements were merely statements of what the 
judges believed the law to be, they were entitled to great respect. As reported 
in the previous paragraph, Bracton’s work tacitly assumes that the 
pronouncements of the judges have a status equal in authority to that of the 
statutory pronouncements of the sovereign. Unsurprisingly, then, De Legibus led 
directly to the publication of the Year Books (1268-1535). 
The Year Books were made possible by the practice of English lawyers and 
law students of recording certain aspects of important judicial decisions that 
they had observed in judicial proceedings. These observers would briefly 
report the relevant facts of the dispute and the arguments of counsel, including 
counsel’s citations to statutes and previous decisions, that is, precedents. 
These lawyers and students would, of course, also summarize the ruling and the 
reasoning of the common law judge or judges as announced orally from the 
bench. As stated above, the rulings themselves consisted of pronouncements of 
what the judges believed the law to be, whether the law was statute law or 
common law in the sense of law as found or proclaimed by the judges in the 
absence of statute. The reasoning that was reported in the Year Books consisted 
of the judges’ application of the law to the facts of the case before them. 
Consequently, 
  
 
readers of the Year Books would find the pronouncements of what the judges 
took to be the binding statutory or common law on the subject at hand as well 
as the reasons why the judges felt that the binding law dictated that they decide 
the case in the way that it was decided. 
Nowadays, many people would say that the common law judges were being 
ingenuous, or even that they were being dishonest. Consider the following. In 
cases where there was an applicable statute, the judges would discuss the 
statute in light of their own precedents, if any, that interpreted the statute. In 
other words, the judges treated their own precedents as being equal in status to 
statutory law. If there were no statutes, the judges would simply treat their own 
precedents as having the same force as statutory law. And whether the judges 
were applying a statute interpreted by precedent or a precedent based on the 
common law, they were often in a position to alter (“distinguish” or “overrule”, 
discussed below) that precedent at will. This was the case if the precedent had 
been issued from the judges’ own court or from a court inferior to their own 
court. 
To summarize, the Year Books reported only the facts of the dispute, the 
arguments of counsel (including precedents and statutes cited), the 
pronouncements of the judges as to the applicable law, and the ruling of the 
judges along with their reasoning, all of which were briefly recorded in writing 
from oral statements made in court. Interestingly, what were not included in the 
Year Books were the actual judgments of the court. Indeed, it was not until 1765, 
with Plowden’s Reports, that court judgments were recorded regularly and 
reliably. The year 1865 saw the publication of the Law Reports by the Incorporated 
Council of Law Reporting, a commission which had been set up specifically for this 
purpose, and which still exists today. It will be seen that the availability and 
reliability of these law reports were crucial to the development of the doctrine of 
precedent as we know it today.3 Everywhere in the common law world today, 
judges sitting on lower courts will follow the published decisions of appellate 
courts in their own judicial hierarchy on questions regarding the interpretation of 
statute law and of the common law. This is due to what can be referred to as 
custom or convention. There are virtually no statutes which require this practice,  
 
 
3. John H Baker, The Common Law Tradition: Lawyers, Books and the Law ch 14 (2000). 
  
 
which is referred to as vertical stare decisis.4 This custom or convention serves 
the obvious public purpose of equality: like cases will be decided alike. In 
addition to serving equality, the custom or convention of vertical stare decisis 
promotes predictability in the law: once the appellate judges have ruled on a 
particular issue, people in that jurisdiction can be quite sure that inferior judges 
will rule the same way. In addition, this practice promotes judicial efficiency: 
when confronted with a legal issue that has already been decided by a higher 
court in their hierarchy, the inferior judges do not need to reexamine the ruling; 
they can simply adopt the ruling as their own. This saves the parties from having 
to appeal, and saves the appellate judges from having to reiterate their previous 
ruling. 
From the above exposition, it would appear that vertical stare decisis has 
been practiced in England at least since the mid-13th century. This is not the case, 
for the horizontal form of stare decisis, that is, the convention of higher courts, 
such as the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and the Supreme Court of the 
United States, to abide by their own precedents. The horizontal form of stare 
decisis first began to establish itself in the common law world, specifically in 
the United States and the United Kingdom, some six centuries after the 
establishment of the vertical form. This also holds true for the modern practice 
of finding the law in individual cases. 
To understand why the horizontal form of stare decisis, and the modern 
practice of finding the law in individual cases, came to be established so late, at 
least relative to the vertical form, one must examine the historical record to 
identify the forces at play. The first relevant development was the enactment of 
the Judicature Acts in 1876.5 Before these enactments, the British courts were not 
organized according to a clearly structured hierarchy. For example, the 
judgments of the common law courts might be appealed within the common 
law judicial system, or they might be challenged in the equity courts, which did 
not adhere to the customary practice of following the decisions of the higher 
courts in the common law system, for they had their own court system. Second, 
before the 19th century, court decisions were not reliably reported and published 
to the general 
 
 
4. One notable exception to this is Article 141 of the Constitution of India, which states 
that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the 
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legal public.6 Without ready access to the decisions of the higher courts, it was 
practically impossible for judges and lawyers alike to find the relevant portion 
of the judgment, that is, its ratio decidendi, discussed below. Without knowing 
the ratio, it is not possible to employ judicial decisions in lieu of statutes. 
The third, and arguably the most important, of these historical forces was 
constitutional in character: the reconsideration of the role of common law, that 
is, judge-made law, in light of the developing democratization and concomitant 
increased respect for separation of powers. From the earliest years of the 
common law, it was thought that the common law was not to be found in 
individual court decisions; rather the case decisions in their totality were a 
reflection of what the law was.7 Law other than statute law was understood to 
exist independently, as if woven in to the fabric of society or perhaps even 
transcendent. This understanding served as a convenient fiction to avoid 
confrontation with the monarchy. Statute law was made by the sovereign, either 
directly by edict from the king or queen, or through the royal organ of the 
Parliament. Common law, in contrast, was not made: it was merely discovered. 
According to this understanding, which we might today call a fiction, judges were 
not acting in a political or legislative way; they were acting like conscientious civil 
servants doing the heavy lifting for the monarchy. This view of the role of judges 
and of precedents persisted literally for centuries. In fact, it was only from the 
beginning of the 19th century that some appellate courts began to speak about 
the binding power of individual legal decisions. Law was not to be found in the 
totality of precedents, but rather in individual precedents.8 As explained in the 
following paragraph, this development suggests that the judges had elevated 
themselves from the role of law-finders to law-makers, or at least had begun to 
acknowledge that this was the case. This radically new view of the role of 
precedents quickly spread throughout the common law world, with the result 
that the birth of the modern doctrine of stare decisis – that the applicable law is 
to be found in the rules (usually called ratios or holdings) announced in individual 
cases – can be dated to the middle of the 19th century.9 
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One of the most significant drivers behind this modern view of the doctrine of 
stare decisis was the work of John Austin (1790-1859), one of the pioneers of 
legal positivism in the common law world. Austin contradicted the then widely 
held view that law was transcendent, capable of being found, but not created. 
He disseminated the positivist notion that law “properly so called” consisted 
only of the norms that originate from the deliberate pen of the legislator or 
other “law giver.”10 The logical consequence of this notion was that, assuming 
a particular law was recognized to be a binding legal rule, to the extent that 
Parliament had not made that law, such as was the case for the common law, 
then the judges must be making it. According to this line of thinking, common law 
judges were necessarily “law givers”. But, according to the doctrine of separation 
of powers, popularized by John Locke (1632–1704) and Montesquieu (1689-
1755), having judges as legislators would contravene the doctrine of separation of 
powers by intruding on the province of the democratically constituted 
Parliament. Without meaning to minimize the positivistic influence of Thomas 
Hobbes (1588-1679) and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), who raised the same 
objections to common law, it was primarily due to Austin’s assault that judicial 
pronouncements would be widely seen, pretty much for the first time, as 
intruding improperly upon the legislative prerogative.11 
Thus chastised by Hobbes, Bentham, and finally Austin, the legal 
establishment began to look at the legal system as follows: First, judges must 
decide the cases presented to them, and they must decide according to law, even 
if the law which they use to decide the case is the common law, that is, judge-
made law. In such cases, the judges are compelled to pronounce what the 
common law is on the subject. Because this pronouncement has the character of 
law, the judges are, admittedly, acting as “law givers”. This is necessary, but it is 
also regrettable because it would have been more democratically legitimate if 
Parliament had pronounced what the law should be on the subject. Second, while 
it is admittedly necessary for judges to pronounce what the law is when the legal 
issue is presented for the first time, and there is no applicable statute, it is 
decidedly not necessary for the judges to change their pronouncement the next 
time a similar case reaches their court. Indeed, it would be best for the judges to 
stand by their previous decision and wait for Parliament to affirm it or re- 
 
10. John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 268 (1832). 
11. See EC Clark, Practical Jurisprudence: A Comment on Austin 4 et seq. (1883). 
  
 
ject it by explicit legislation. If Parliament did not reject the pronouncement, 
that would be seen as an affirmation. By deferring to Parliament in this way, 
judges believed that they were not only protecting equality and predictability in 
the law, not to mention acting efficiently,12 but that they were also showing 
respect for democracy and separation of powers. 
This positivist approach led the British judiciary to adopt a strict understanding 
of the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis. At the end of the 19th century, the 
Lords of Appeal in Ordinary or “Law Lords”, the most senior judges in the United 
Kingdom at the time, declared in London Street Tramways v London County 
Council that they regarded themselves to be bound by their own earlier 
judgments on the law (at least those involving the interpretation of statutes) until 
Parliament acted to change those judgments.13 This ruling remained in force for 
over half a century. It was not until 1966 that the Law Lords in a Practice 
Statement announced that they would in future depart from the approach 
announced in London Street Tramways. However, they would depart from 
previous precedents only when they felt that failure to do so would lead to 
injustice or would obstruct the development of the law.14 In announcing this 
momentous change of direction, the Law Lords specifically acknowledged two 
universally recognized justifications for overruling precedents: mistake and 
changes in society. These are discussed in the following section. 
In contrast to the House of Lords (now the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom), the Court of Appeal of England and Wales still considers itself to be 
bound by its own previous decisions, subject to a number of exceptions. Yet it 
recognizes that the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom may overrule these 
decisions by pronouncing a new rule.15 
In the United States, in line with the venerable judicial practice in common 
law jurisdictions, both federal and state courts adhere to the doctrine of vertical 
stare decisis. However, American courts, unlike the British Law Lords, have never 
voluntarily relinquished their prerogative to de- 
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part from their own previous decisions. They continued to shape and mould 
their jurisprudence as they saw fit, without waiting for the federal Congress or 
the state legislatures to intervene. 
Departures from previous decisions (“overruling”) are the subject of the 
following section. “Distinguishing” is explained in section C. 
 
 
2.     The overruling of precedents 
 
When do courts depart from their previous decisions, and when should they? 
To answer these questions, Lewis A Kornhauser employs the model of an immortal 
judge.16 In this imaginary court system, which consists of a single judge, the 
training, experience, and fundamental personal values of the immortal judge will 
influence to some degree how the judge sees the cases, the judge’s selection of 
the applicable statutes, the judge’s selection of the applicable case decisions, 
and the judge’s solutions. Provided the immortal judge has perfect recall of all 
of her previous decisions, similar cases will be decided alike to a degree 
unattainable by any group of judges, no matter how well trained. For the 
individuals in the group will differ in their training, experience, fundamental 
personal values, etc. The quality of the decision-making in such a legal system 
would ensure an extremely high degree of equality, legal predictability, and trust 
in the judiciary (legitimacy). 
According to Kornhauser, faced with a case with facts similar to one of her 
precedents, the immortal judge will only depart from a precedent (in other 
words, she would only overrule one) in three situations: first, if she now realizes 
that she made a mistake in the previous case; second, if important social, legal, 
or other features of society have changed since she announced the previous 
decision; or third, if her fundamental personal values have changed. We know 
that normal, mortal judges make mistakes now and then, even those sitting in 
the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, as they have acknowledged this in 
their 1966 Practice Statement, where they recognized their ability and 
responsibility to correct their previous per incuriam (“through lack of care”) 
decisions. Where the social situation, perceptions of public policy, or 
developments in the law have changed since the previous ruling, even the 
Justices of the United 
 
16. Lewis A Kornhauser, “Modeling Collegial Courts, II,” Journal of Law, Economics & 
Organization 441 et seq. (1992). 
  
 
Kingdom Supreme Court will occasionally change their minds; and, in doing so, 
we will expect them to describe what has changed and to justify the resultant, 
changed legal consequences. A dynamic understanding of the stare decisis 
doctrine therefore makes exceptions to the horizontal effect of precedents in 
the interests of correcting errors (corrective overrulings) and of updating case 
decisions to comport with modern situations (renovative overrulings). 
What of the third situation identified by Kornhauser in which the immortal 
judge might amend her previous rulings: changes in the judge’s personal 
fundamental  values? In  reality, neither immortal nor  mortal judges are likely to 
change their personal fundamental values. In the real world, an overruling which 
can only be explained by a change in the personal fundamental values of the 
judges is one that is due to a change in the composition of the court. This type of 
overruling is described here as being legislative or political. As witnessed in the 
London Street Tramways case, and as reiterated in the 1966 Practice Statement, it 
is this type of ruling – here termed legislative or political overruling – which the 
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom believes must be avoided for fear of 
treading on Parliament’s toes. Recalling that the vertical form of stare decisis 
serves three jurisprudential purposes – equality, legal predictability, and efficiency 
– it is submitted that the horizontal form has a fourth purpose: respect for 
separation of powers. This purpose encourages judges not to upset the decisions 
of their predecessors on the court simply because they would have decided the 
case differently if they had been on the court at the time the case was decided. 
Two leading American political scientists, Saul Brenner and Harold Spaeth, 
published a study in 1995 in which they examined the overruling practice of the 
United States Supreme Court over a number of years, including 1953 through 
1969, the years in which Earl Warren was Chief Justice. The Warren Court, as it is 
known, was widely seen then and now as an activist court which, among other 
things, expanded the rights of those who stood accused of crimes in the federal 
and in the state courts.17 This required the overruling of a good number of 
precedents that had shown great deference to the legislatures and judges of the 
states. Brenner and Spaeth shared the view that the United States Supreme Court 
was activist in the years that they researched, as the provocative title of their  
 
17. See generally Frederick P Lewis, The Context of Judicial Activism: The Endurance of the 
Warren Court Legacy in a Conservative Age (1999). 
  
 
book makes clear: Stare Indecisis: The Alteration of Precedent on the Supreme 
Court 1946-1992. Over this span of years, Brenner and Spaeth identified 11518 
decisions in which the United States Supreme Court overruled one or more of 
its precedents.19 According to the research of the author of this paper, in the 
period from 1966 to 2010 the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, or its 
predecessor the Law Lords, overruled 12 previous decisions.20 While these years 
were not known as years of judicial activism in the United Kingdom, it should be 
remembered that the Law Lords had been refusing to overrule their previous 
decisions since the London Street Tramways decision in 1898. 
In order to compare the overruling practices of these two courts, one must 
also know that the United States Supreme Court issued 6,553 full decisions 
during the years 1946 to 1992,21  whereas the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom and the Law Lords issued only 1,315 during the years 1966 to 2010. 
Further, there was a significant disparity in the number of judges who sat on the 
two courts during these periods of time: only 29 on the United States Supreme 
Court, and 62 on the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. Mindful of these 
divergences, and of the fact that the periods of time studied do not coincide, 
it is nonetheless tempting to compare the relative rates of overruling by the 
two courts. Doing so reveals that the United States Supreme Court overruled at a 
rate of 1.13 per cent while the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom overruled at 
a rate of 0.61 per cent. 
These facts and figures, although crude, suggest that the Supreme Court 
of the United Kingdom is approximately twice as deferential to precedents as 
the United States Supreme Court. This on its own is inter- 
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1992 appendix I (1995). 
20. Four of these were decided before 1966, reducing the number of overruled deci- 
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21. Epstein, Segal, Spaeth, & Walker, The Supreme Court Compendium: Data, Decisions, 
and Developments 212 (2nd ed 1996). 
  
 
esting. But perhaps the justices of the United States Supreme Court made more 
mistakes than their British brethren and therefore had to correct their 
jurisprudence more often (corrective overruling). Or it might be the case that 
the American justices had more of a need to update their jurisprudence to 
comport with modern situations (renovative overrulings). As explained above, 
these two types of overruling – corrective and renovative – are consistent with 
separation of powers and respect for the legislative branch of government. 
The only type of overruling which is arguably22 disrespectful of separation of 
powers is legislative or political overruling. Consequently, rather than looking at 
the gross percentages of overrulings in general, it would be more revealing for 
our purposes to assess and compare the rates of political overrulings. If one 
disregards the non-political overrulings (i.e., the corrective and renovative ones) 
and just calculates the rate of political overruling, one finds that the United 
States Supreme Court engages in political overruling at a rate of 0.47 per cent, 
which is six times more often that the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (0.08 
per cent). Thus, employing this measure, one can generalize by saying that the 
United States Supreme Court is far more likely than the Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom to overrule politically. 
But this imbalance might be traceable to a fundamental difference 
between the roles of the two courts. The United States Supreme Court, unlike 
the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, has the power to declare acts of 
the President and of the Congress of the United States, and the governors and 
legislatures of the states, to be unconstitutional under the United States 
Constitution. The only direct way for these organs of government to “correct” 
such a declaration is to amend the United States Constitution, which is an 
extremely difficult task.23 In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, the 
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom does not hold this power, so that 
Parliament retains the power to “correct” rulings of the Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom by a simple act of Parliament. This means that the Justices of the 
United States Supreme Court, unlike their brethren on the United Kingdom Court, 
have an obligation to 
 
 
22. Here a distinction must be made between judicial interpretation of statutes and judicial 
interpretation of a constitution. The former may be “corrected” by the legislature; the latter 
not. Consequently, judges should arguably be more willing to overrule decisions interpreting 
the constitution. 
23. Thomas Lundmark, Power & Rights in US Constitutional Law 70-92 (2nd ed 2008). 
  
 
revisit previous decisions to the extent that they are based on United States 
Constitutional law. 
If one considers these constitutional factors, bears in mind that the rates of 
overruling and the numbers of overruling cases are small, and remembers 
that the classification between political versus non-political overrulings is 
inexact, it would be misleading to generalize further than to conclude on the 
basis of this study alone that the overruling practice of the two courts is similar. 
 
 
 
3. Finding the ratio decidendi, using the ratio like a statutory 
norm, and distinguishing 
 
Having addressed the historical and jurisprudential framework for following 
precedents, we will now consider how precedent is actually used. In order to 
apply a previous decision, the first task is to find a decided case with basically 
similar facts (a process of equivalence). This process involves the same mental 
process as looking for relevant statutes. In fact, many if not most precedents are 
the result of statutory interpretation. 
Once a case with similar facts has been found, it is necessary to identify the 
rule – the ratio decidendi – of the case that has been found. This need to identify 
the ratio of the case holds both for cases that interpret and apply statutes 
(i.e., statutory rules) and for cases that interpret and apply propositions (i.e., 
judge-made rules) of the common law (i.e., law in the absence of a statute). In 
cases that interpret and apply statutes, the ratios announced by the court 
represent, in effect, concretizations of how the statute is to be applied in the 
particular circumstances of the case. Similarly, in cases that interpret and apply 
propositions of common law (i.e., common law rules), just as with cases that 
interpret and apply statutes (i.e., statutory rules), the ratios announced by the 
court represent, in effect, concretizations of how the common law rule is to be 
applied in the particular circumstances of the case. 
The ratio is sometimes referred to as the holding or the rule of the case, and 
represents that aspect of the case which may be binding precedent. In almost all 
cases, the ratio has been stated in the form of a rule by one or more of the 
judges who decided the precedent. Ordinarily, that rule can be found as a 
headnote at the beginning of the published report of the case. It is almost never 
necessary to extract or induce the ratio from the case. Indeed, in author’s many 
years of practicing law in which he dealt with hundreds of cases, he cannot 
remember a single instance in which it was necessary to induce the ratio. 
Up to this point, the only function of the facts of the case has been as a mean 
to help to locate the statutory or common law rule that appears to provide the 
solution to the case at hand. This even holds true for the extremely few cases 
in which the ratio must be extracted or induced from the case. To state the 
  
obvious: one must first find the case before one can induce a ratio from it. 
 
3.1. The textual approach to using the ratio 
Once identified, how is a ratio decidendi used? Simply said, it is used like a 
statutory rule. The most common approach is to apply the ratio according to its 
wording, just as one would apply a statute in a textual manner. This approach or 
“method” is also known as the linguistic method or the plain meaning rule of 
statutory interpretation. At its core, the textual approach asks, “What does the 
rule say?” As such, this approach is fundamentally concerned with the wording 
of the ratio in question and aims to establish the meaning of the individual 
words or of the sentence as a whole. In so doing, it aims to ascertain what the 
ratio is actually stating, rather than what the judge or judges who articulated 
the ratio actually intended to say. (This is the subject of the historical 
interpretation, discussed in the follow section.) It should be noted that this 
method of interpretation is not restricted to legal rules; it is frequently used in all 
subjects in the humanities to determine the meaning of textual passages.24  
Perhaps as a consequence of the general acceptance of the validity of this 
approach, some people are of the view that this method of interpretation should 
take precedence over the others.25 In the author’s experience as a practicing 
lawyer, the vast majority of uses of ratios employ the textual approach. 
 
3.2. The historical approach to using the ratio 
The historical approach to statutory interpretation is sometimes termed 
“subjective interpretation” because it asks, “What did the people who 
drafted the rule mean?” A more pointed way to put the question is, “How would 
these people decide the case at hand?” This approach aims to identify what the 
members of the legislature intended to say, rather than what 
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they actually did say, which is the aim of linguistic interpretation.26 In order to 
follow the train of thought of the members of the legislature, the interpreting 
judge or lawyer will consult the legislative history or travaux préparatoires. This 
might include statements by proponents of the legislation and the minutes of 
committee meetings and the like. This approach is always problematic. For one 
thing, it is often difficult to find documentation. This is especially true for older 
legislation. For another, social and economic conditions may have changed 
since the statute was enacted. Other problems arise because of the length of 
the legislative process and the inability to assess whether, for example, a 
statement of intent as stated in the report of a committee was actually shared 
by the members of the legislature who voted in favour of the legislation, or 
even if they had knowledge of the content of the committee report. Because of 
such problems, the historical approach is often of questionable use to statutory 
interpretation. 
Turning to the interpretation of ratios, the situation regarding the historical 
approach is not nearly so dire. After all, the ratio will be found in a judicial decision 
that was reached by a small number of judges who had access to the same 
materials and who heard the same oral arguments. Not infrequently, individual 
judges will add a concurring judgment to the judgment of the court. 
Consequently, it is much easier to answer the more pointed question above: 
“How would these people decide the case at hand?” 
When we engage in this exercise of trying to imagine how the judges who 
decided the precedential case would decide the case at hand, it is important 
to recognize that we are employing the historical approach to interpretation and 
not, as commonly thought, applying the precedent by analogy. Statements such 
as the following, which is just one of many, are therefore patently mistaken: 
“This type of reasoning in common law is called case-based reasoning, which 
is inductive in nature ... Civil law relies more on rule-based reasoning, which is 
deductive in nature.”27 
 
 
 
 
26. Dieter Schmalz, Methodenlehre für das juristische Studium paragraph 247 (3rd ed 1992). 
27. Fleure Nievelstein, Tamara van Gog, & Frans J Prins, “Learning Law: The Problems 
with Ontology and Reasoning,” Handbook of Research for Educational Communications 
and Technology 553 (David Jonassen et al eds 2008). 
  
 
3.3. The teleological (functional) approach to using the ratio 
The teleological or functional approach to statutory interpretation derives its 
name from the ancient Greek telos, meaning “aim”. In statutory interpretation, 
this approach seeks to determine the meaning and purpose of the statutory 
rule, the so-called ratio legis.28 This approach to statutory interpretation 
summarizes the relevant arguments for the interpretation of statutes that do 
not fall within the ambit of the textual or historical approaches. In this respect, 
the term “teleological” is used in order to differentiate this approach from the 
textual and historical approaches, which are necessarily limited respectively to 
textual arguments and to evidence from the historical record. One can 
summarize as follows: While the textual approach asks “What does the rule 
say?” and historical approach asks “What did the people who drafted the rule 
mean?” the teleological approach asks “What do we think the rule should 
mean?”29 
In statutory interpretation, the regulatory purpose of the statute is to be 
determined in the abstract, that is, in isolation from any actual legal dispute. 
Nevertheless, the regulatory purpose of the statute is easier and more accurately 
determined if one also considers the conflicts of interest that underlie the act. 
For every statute is the result of a weighing up of opposing interests.30   In effect, 
every statute is a hypothetical judgment about which interests, and 
consequently which party, should prevail. Accordingly, in the context of statutory 
interpretation, it must be asked how the members of the legislature evaluated 
these conflicts of interest, and which interests were chosen to predominate.31 
Everything said above about the teleological or functional approach to 
statutory interpretation applies with equal force to the interpretation of ratios. 
Just as with statutory rules, case-based rules can be expanded and restricted. As 
described by Kornhauser in his discussion of the doctrine of 
 
 
 
 
28. While Savigny named this method “systematic”, he was nevertheless referring to what we 
know today as the teleological method. Klaus Adomeit &  Susanne Hähnchen, Rechtstheorie 
für Studenten paragraph 66 (5th ed 2008). 
29. Rolf Wank, Die Auslegung von Gesetzen 97 (3rd ed 2005). 
30. Dieter Schmalz, Methodenlehre für das juristische Studium paragraph 251 (3rd ed 1992). 
31. Norbert Horn, Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft und Rechtsphilosophie paragraph 182 
(5th ed 2011). See generally Dieter Schmalz, Methodenlehre für das juristische Studium 
paragraph 252 (3rd ed 1992) and Peter Schwacke & Rolf Uhlig, Juristische Methodik mit 
Technik der Fallbearbeitung und Normsetzungslehre 37 (2nd ed 1985). 
  
 
stare decisis in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics,32 one might look 
behind the ratio for a broad legal principle. This corresponds to looking behind 
a statutory rule for a broad function or purpose, which is ordinarily termed a 
teleological extension when speaking of statutory interpretation. In the opinion 
of the author, this nomenclature should also be used when speaking of ratios. On 
the other hand, one might narrow the ratio to the fact-based result of the case. 
This corresponds to a teleological reduction of a statute. There is, therefore, 
some flexibility in how a court may choose to use the ratio from a precedential 
case, just as there is flexibility in how statutes are applied. 
The processes of finding the appropriate case or cases (the process of 
equivalence) and of identifying and articulating the binding ratios also involve the 
process of distinguishing. Distinguishing is the name given to the decision of the 
judge not to employ the ratio of an arguably binding precedent. Sometimes, 
judges depart from an arguably binding precedent by establishing significant 
differences in the facts of the case or the previous decision with the result that two 
superficially similar cases turn out to be not so similar after all. In this way, the 
judges are restricting the scope of application of the ratio from the previous 
decision. Using Kornhauser’s vocabulary, one would say that the judges are 
reducing the rule of the previous decision to its fact-based result. As stated above, 
the author suggests that this be termed a teleological reduction. No matter 
what nomenclature is used, the effect of distinguishing is to release the case in 
question from applying the rule from the arguably precedential case. 
This process of distinguishing, by the way, is exactly the same process as is 
used when a judge decides not to employ an arguably applicable statute. 
Sometimes, the judge will establish significant differences between the facts as 
stated in the statute and those found by the judge. This is commonly done by 
defining or re-defining the statutory language so that the statute, which seemed 
superficially similar to that case at hand, turns out to be not so similar after all. In 
this way, the judge (teleologically) reduces the reach of the statute. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32. Lewis A Kornhauser, “Stare Decisis,” New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 
vol 3 (Peter Newmann ed 1998). 
  
 
4.     The role of precedents in civil law jurisdictions 
 
Although civil law jurisdictions do not expressly recognize the doctrine of stare 
decisis, civilian judges in the first instance work in judicial hierarchies in which they 
are expected to follow the rulings of the judges on the appellate courts. In 
addition to creating more work for the appellate courts, the failure of lower court 
judges to follow appellate court rulings would violate notions of equality, lessen 
predictability, and undermine the public’s trust in the judiciary. Further, many 
civil law countries have statutes on the books that require inferior judges to 
follow the decisions of judges superior to them in the judicial hierarchy.33 In 
addition, there are statutes regulating the binding power of precedents of the 
various panels on appellate courts in civilian jurisdictions.34 To promote efficiency, 
predictability, and collegiality, the legislatures in civilian jurisdictions often 
enact statutes requiring all panels of such courts either to follow the previous 
rulings of the other panels, or else call for an en banc decision of all of the panels 
of the court so that they can reach agreement on how the law should be 
interpreted. 
In fact, such en banc decisions are extremely rare.35 In the vast majority of 
cases, the judges of the other panels accept the considered judgments of their 
colleagues on the other panels. It is also very rare for the panels to overrule their 
own decisions. 
These assertions can be illustrated by the following statistics that the author 
has collected on the German Federal Constitutional Court. In the first  55  years  
of  the  German  Federal  Constitutional  Court’s  existence (1951-2006) in which it 
published 2,999 full decisions,36  the two senates of 
 
 
33. E.g., German Federal Constitutional Court Statute (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz) 
§ 31 (I). 
34. E.g., German Federal Constitutional Court Statute (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz) 
§ 16. See also chapter 3, section 5 of the Swedish Procedural Code (rättegångsbalken), 
discussed in Gunnar Bergholz & Aleksander Peczenik, “Precedent in Sweden,” In- 
terpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study 300 et seq. (N MacCormick & RS Summers 
eds 1997). 
35. Thomas   Lundmark,   “Stare   decisis   vor   dem   Bundesverfassungsgericht,”   28 
Rechtstheorie 330 et seq. (1997); Thomas Lundmark, Charting the Divide between Com- 
mon and Civil Law 332 et seq. (2012). 
36. This figure was arrived at by adding up all of the judgments in the official reports, 
the Sammlung der Bundesverfassungsgerichtsentscheidungen  (BVerfGE). During the 
same period, the three-judge chambers, which are discussed below, issued 133,831 
  
 
the German Federal Constitutional Court departed from only 15 previous 
decisions in addition to four departures under the section 16 en banc procedure 
of the German Federal Constitutional Court Statute. Using the methodology 
employed above for the United States Supreme Court, which, like the German 
Federal Constitutional Court, has the power of constitutional judicial review, one 
can conclude that the United States Supreme Court is nearly twice as likely as 
the German Federal Constitutional Court to overrule previous cases (an 
overruling rate of 1.13 per cent compared to 0.63 per cent respectively). 
Furthermore, as reported in a previous section of this paper, the author’s 
research shows that the United States Supreme Court engaged in political 
overrulings at a rate of 0.47 per cent compared to a rate of 0.37 per cent for 
the German Court. These figures suggest that the German Federal Constitutional 
Court shows roughly the same respect for precedents as the United States 
Supreme Court. 
 
 
5.     Conclusion 
 
Although respect for previous judicial decisions can be traced back to the earliest 
centuries of the common law, the doctrine of stare decisis as we know it today 
– the search for the law in single judicial decisions – did not arise until the 19th 
century. There are three basic reasons why it did not arise earlier: (1) the 
unclear structure of the judicial hierarchies before 1875; (2) the unavailability 
of reliable reports of the judicial decisions; and, most importantly, (3) the 
realization that judicial decision-making is a form of law-making, and law-making 
should be left as much as possible to the legislature. 
The law pronounced in judicial decisions can only be effective as law if the 
populace believes that the judges will not change their decisions arbitrarily. 
Consequently, overrulings should ordinarily be limited to those which correct 
mistakes (corrective overruling) and those which seek to update previous 
decisions in light of changes in society (renovative overrulings). “Political” or 
“legislative” overrulings are those which cannot be classified as corrective or 
renovative. They are due to the appointment of new judges to the court. But even 
these overrulings have a place, especially when the court is construing 
constitutional law. 
 
decisions   and   disposed   of   1,789   applications   for   preliminary   relief.   See 
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/organisation/organisation.html. 
  
 
Stare decisis is not limited to the common law world. Convincing evidence 
of a similar process can be found in civil law jurisdictions like Germany. The 
overruling practice of the German Federal Constitutional Court, for example, 
looks very similar to that of the United States Supreme Court. 
The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the fundamental principle of justice: 
that like cases must be decided alike, that is, equality. The vertical aspect of the 
doctrine serves equality, predictability, and efficiency. The horizontal aspect also 
serves a fourth purpose: judicial respect for separation of powers. This fourth 
purpose engenders public trust in the justice system and in that way enhances 
the legitimacy of the entire legal system. 
